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ABSTRACT
In response to diverging perspectives on the usefulness of attacker-
centric approaches in security, this paper examines the current role
of such thinking in security, incorporating 12 in-depth interviews
with senior nancial services practitioners working in the areas of
security, fraud and risk. The presentation of results is supported by
a condensed systematic literature review on the topic and followed
by the provision of a list of suggested guidelines on practical im-
plementation strategies, enabling further theoretical reframing and
extension.
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1 INTRODUCTION
While threat modelling methods currently in existence use various
foci and levels of formalisation [39], taking an attacker-centric
approach seems contested in literature: over the last decade, Adam
Shostack as a central gure in threat modelling and author of several
key works in the eld [40] has been a strong advocate against
approaches requiring security professionals, developers and other
stakeholders to ‘think like an attacker’; stating that most security
professionals will not be able to eectively and eciently threat
model based on a relatively unstructured list of attackers or by
simulating how a mostly unknown attacker is likely to think or act
(potentially also introducing own bias [1, 40] p.41.
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Other academic works in the area of threat modelling (e.g. Me-
land et al. [26]) follow this line of thinking, giving preference to
asset-/risk- or system-centric views for their ability to model on ex-
isting elements such as data ows or stores. In contrast, Mead et al.
[25] saw encouraging results for attacker-centric methodologies in
their evaluation eorts in using attacker-centric ‘persona non grata’
representations of “archetypal users who behave in unwanted, pos-
sibly nefarious ways”. The positive value of attacker-centric threat
modelling is recognised by others, e.g. by Kayem et al. [19] in their
comparative analysis of threat modelling approaches. ‘Thinking like
an attacker’ has also seen wide uptake in the professional security
community [13], with attacker-centric thinking also forming part
of university courses [14]. However, many approaches to threat
modelling, whether formal or informal, ex between dierent foci
and perspectives, with e.g. Mead et al. [25] suggesting combining
system- and attacker-centric modelling into a hybrid approach and
Atzeni et al. [1] calling on attacker personas to prevent potential
modeller bias encountered in other methods (e.g. attack trees). De-
riving from user stories in agile software development, Hurlbut
[15] describes the usage of attacker-based stories to support system-
centric threat modelling in a commercial context. And despite his
issues with attacker-centric threat modelling, Shostack includes
attacker lists and personas in his book [40].
Inspired by this identied divergence in perspectives on attacker-
centric approaches in security literature, this work seeks to provide
an initial insight into attacker-centric thinking in practice. For this
purpose, an interview study involving 12 senior nancial services
practitioners is carried out, inviting their opinions and ideas on such
approaches in semi-structured, relatively open-ended and informal
conversations. In addition to learning more about the ways these
approaches are used as part of their daily work routines, their
benets and limitations as well as future potential are investigated
in collaboration with the practioners. While the primary intention
of this work is to reect on the practical value, usage and limitations
of attacker-centric approaches in security as a relatively narrow
‘niche’ topic, it is also hoped that the insights and data derived from
the interviews with an elite group will support other researchers
in their work and encourage critical discussions at an academic or
industry level on this specic topic in the future.
To document this research, this paper is structured as follows:
rst, a condensed systematic literature review is presented. Sec-
ondly, the methodology employed, including the exact data col-
lection and analysis methods, is outlined. This is followed by the
presentation of the results from the primary data analysis — to
help aid the reader, these are grouped around ve emerging themes.
An attempt is made to synthesise these results into tentative, but
tangible guidelines and reections on attacker-centric thinking.
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2 BACKGROUND
In preparation to the practitioner interviews, a dedicated system-
atic literature review on the topic of attacker-centric approaches
in security was carried out, using the works of Kitchenham et al.
[21] on systematic literature reviews in software engineering and
the recent example of a systematic literature review on threat anal-
ysis of software systems by Tuma et al. [45] as a guide. Topics
researched included the level of research activity observed in the
last decade, research directions, benets and limitations as well as
future potential indicated. Ten databases and platforms (e.g. ACM
Digital, SpringerLink and Google Scholar) were scanned, using
the search terms “attacker/adversary centric/-centred/-centered”;
“threat modelling” AND “attacker” and “attacker model”. Addition-
ally, reference lists were reviewed for potentially related materials
(‘reverse snowballing’). Following review and selection1, 32 papers
in total were reviewed — due to the limitations of this paper, this
section provides an overview on the topic in form of a compressed
version with a selection of references from this review (available in
full at [30]).
Understanding of ‘attacker-centric’ — Interestingly, no exact de-
nitions of ‘attacker-centric’ beyond explanations such as the “per-
spective of an attacker’s tools, motivations and objectives” [38]
can be found in the sample. Overall however, an attacker-centric
perspective seems to be understood and valued in two ways. Firstly,
no attacks are ever committed without an attacker: “the adversarial
element is an intrinsic part of the design of secure systems” [1].
Secondly, many studies mention an element of ‘think like an at-
tacker’ or assuming the role of an attacker through attacker-centric
perspectives (e.g. in Tariq et al. [42] or Yuan et al. [47]), with several
authors also discussing this approach critically (e.g. Shostack [40]).
Techniques, tools and vehicles used — Attacker-centric threat mod-
elling and risk assessments can be carried out and supported using a
large number of techniques, tools and vehicles. This is also strongly
reected in the sample, conrming the many ways that attack-
ers may form part of threat modelling and analysis approaches,
ranging from widely recognised threat modelling elements such as
STRIDE [47], attack-trees [24], misuse cases and (anti-)scenarios
[47], misuse maps and diagrams [26], anti-scenarios [42] to truly
attacker-focussed approaches such as attacker personas [1] or simi-
larly the ‘persona non grata’ in Mead et al. [25].
Perceived benets of attacker-centric approaches — The number of
explicitly stated benets of using an attacker-centric lens is limited
in the sample. There seems to be an underlying perception however
that understanding or modelling attackers behind past or potential
future attacks is benecial, e.g. for assessing and subsequently pri-
oritising threats [41], designing and testing countermeasures [6]
or forensics purposes [35] or to “provide general insight into the
attacker’s mind” [6]. Several authors see the creation of reusable
threat agent or attacker reference libraries as useful for future secu-
rity practice [6]. But attacker representations are also considered
extremely valuable to stakeholders: they may support their decision-
making and provide condence in “emergency response situations”
[35], but also aid day-to-day communications. Yuan et al. [47] and
1Originally, 94 items were identied for potential selection. Inclusion and exclusion
criteria include relevance to subject area, adequate detail on how attacker behaviour
and characteristics are used as well as sucient quality and reliability (B rating in
CORE database [45]).
Tariq et al. [42] also see an attacker-centric perspective as a vehicle
of collaboration — enabling and engaging developers, security pro-
fessionals and other stakeholders to consider illegitimate use cases
in product designs, but also to better understand the implications
on security caused by their design decisions.
Validation eorts — Most studies have included a validation ap-
proach, with many based on case studies, e.g. Fraunholz et al. [11]
amongst many others. Other validation strategies include compar-
isons to similar approaches in literature (also [11]) or exemplary
illustrations and demonstrations (without a specic real-world case
study, e.g. [24, 47]). Several authors will use tool support for their
validation eort: Meland et al. [26] use the threat modelling tool
‘SeaMonster’, while Faily & Fléchais [10] use their CAIRIS platform.
Valuation eorts are however not limited to this: interviews with
stakeholders, explorative surveys with subject matter experts or
heuristics are mentioned as ways to assess and validate the quality
of threat models [40, 42].
Limitations and issues identied — Despite these validation at-
tempts, authors in the sample have identied a number of limita-
tions to their studies — not all of these are specic to the attacker as-
pect in threat modelling, but highlight overall current methodolog-
ical weaknesses identied in the sample. Firstly, attacker-centric
approaches and tools like attacker lists or personas may not of-
fer enough structure for modellers to reliably identify threats [40]
— they demand a very good, often unrealistic understanding of
potential attackers, making them prone to error or bias from the
person undertaking the modelling. There may also be problems
with validation and quality assurance: here, an overreliance on case
studies and illustrations and lack of measurements for assessing
the quality of outcomes for threat modelling processes is seen as
problematic [27, 45]. Additionally, many diverging directions are
already in existence, which prompts Karpati et al. [17] to suggest
that “new modelling methods should be extremely well motivated
by challenges for or limitations of existing methods” [26]. The issue
of reusability is also brought up here — reusing threat models and
their results are viewed as benecial “for knowledge sharing and to
achieve a general increase in eciency and quality” to the process
by Meland et al. [26] — eorts in this direction seem limited to date.
Implications for practitioners identied in literature — Many of
the limitations identied will have direct impact on practitioners
and their ability to use attacker-centric approaches eectively. Ease
of adoption and continuous usage may be hindered by the limited
tool support and guidelines [45]. In particular, small and medium
sized organisations with limited resources are thought to seldomly
employ threat modelling practices [44]. Expectations towards prac-
titioners set by threat modelling may also be unrealistic: asking
practitioners such as developers and engineers ‘to think like an
attacker’ may be a challenge [25, 40, 44]. Karpati et al. [17] also note
that current threat modelling methods may not satisfy all stake-
holder requirements in the best way, for example support them
optimally when communicating with other (senior) stakeholders
in their organisation. In contrast, threat modelling is seen to help
optimise security investment and lead to cost-eective security in
organisations, along the lines of ‘how secure is secure enough?’
[40].
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3 METHODOLOGY
To examine how digital banking professionals consider attackers in
their daily practice, a qualitative data collection through 12 semi-
structured interviews with senior practitioners at a case company
was carried out. In their well-structured study on UX professionals
working in an agile context, Bruun et al. [4] view such a case
study approach as “appropriate for developing an understanding
of a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context” (attacker-
centric thinking in banking). The case company is a large European
banking organisation with over 50,000 employees, covering retail,
business and corporate banking with a dedicated security and risk
function.
The author is aware of the restriction to one individual company
and resulting potential implications (e.g. bias to specic organisa-
tional practices) — at this point in time however, the results were
deemed as insightful and conclusive enough to warrant interim pub-
lication. An update involving practitioners from additional nancial
services companies may be of value in the future.
3.1 Data collection
Managers at middle, senior and executive level in nancial services
institutions working in all elds of security, fraud or risk functions
form a corporate elite2. This group can be dicult to access and
recruit for in-depth interviews due to organisational gatekeeping,
time constraints or lack of compelling reason to participate (“what’s
in it for me anyway?” in Thomas [43]).
The researcher benetted from a unique position of being af-
liated with a large nancial services institution, which provided
an entry point for recruitment and initial access to a small group
of senior practitioners who were also prepared to introduce the
researcher to some of their contacts in the organisation. The posi-
tionality of the researcher can be described as follows: while the
researcher was an employee and therefore colleague of the partic-
ipants (an insider), she was also an outsider as she didn’t know
any of the individuals personally and had never worked with them
before or even in the same area. Rather than taking a binary in-
sider/outsider position, the researcher aimed for a collaborative,
transitional perspective, incorporating both relative objectivity (out-
side view) and organisational and subject knowledge (inside view)
[31]. In addition, it was made clear throughout all stages that the
position of the researcher was the one of an academic rather than
a colleague at this point (‘student role’ [23]). At the same time, the
study and work with the researcher was positioned as a two-way
relationship, where the researcher would feed back on the results
and establish a longer-term dialogue with the participants if of
interest (‘consultant role’ [23]).
The individuals initially approached held various security-related
positions in the organisation and had diverse backgrounds (e.g.
theoretical computer science degrees or extensive professional ex-
perience in the area of fraud) as well as levels of seniority, which
ensured an initial ‘sample seed diversity’ [20]. A rst round of four
2In this study, the following understanding and denition of the term elite brought
forward by Welch et al. [46] in their work on working with international business
elites is largely agreed on: “[...] occupies a senior or middle management position;
has functional responsibility in an area which enjoys high status in accordance with
corporate values; has considerable industry experience and frequently also long tenure
with the company; possesses a broad network of personal relationships [...]”.
Table 1: Overview of study participants*
# Role Area Seniority
1 Threat Intelligence Security Manager
2 Threat Intelligence Security Senior Manager
3 General security Security Senior Manager
4 General Security Security Executive
5 Threat Intelligence Security Manager
6 Operational Risk Mgmt. Risk Senior Manager
7 Operational Risk Mgmt. Risk Manager
8 Operational Risk Mgmt. Risk Senior Manager
9 Fraud Strategy Fraud Executive
10 Fraud Strategy Fraud Executive
11 Fraud Strategy Fraud Senior Manager
12 Fraud Strategy Fraud Manager
*in order interviewed
initial interviews was held at this point (August 2018) and analysed
(while two further interviews were held at the time, the intervie-
wees choose not to participate). Given the encouraging results, a
further round of eight interviews was undertaken in early 2019,
also looking to broaden the scope of participants in areas like fraud
and risk (as recommended by rst round participants).
In total, 12 semi-structured, qualitative interviews were con-
ducted (refer to Table 1), based on the guidelines on qualitative
interviews in Patton [34] and more specically in an HCI context
from Blandford et al. [3]. The interviews lasted between 45 to 90
minutes, either face-to-face on company premises where possible,
via video conferencing or on the phone.
An interview guide built around 3 themes (refer to Table 2) was
used by the researcher, enabling a conversational interview style
without compromising on consistency — the aim was to enable se-
nior practitioners in nancial services to share their own thoughts
and opinions freely, however with a level of control from the re-
searcher (avoiding a ‘power shift’ where the participant dominates
and directs the interview [43, 46]).
Adhering to company guidance to avoid audio recordings, exten-
sive notes were taken throughout the interviews by the researcher
(a process participants were very familiar with from other internal
interviews, e.g. for recruiting purposes). The exact write-up of these
notes was shared back with the participants for review and sign-o,
rstly, to aid conrming the reliability of the data collected (‘mem-
ber checking’3), but also to support the process of gaining consent in
writing from all participants. This was viewed as highly important
given the sensitive nature of this study, where senior members of
an organisation would potentially discuss security-related aspects
of their role and every day work [29].
3Member checking is a form of participant validation — results, for example from
interviews, are returned to the participants/interviewees for them to check their
accuracy and the provided results matching their experiences [2]. At this point, partic-
ipants/interviewees may also request to alter certain details (e.g. due to misinterpreta-
tion) or ask for information to be removed (e.g. to ensure they remain anonymous).
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Table 2: Overview of interview process and structure
Stage Activities and content theme
Pre-
interview:
rst contact
Introduction of researcher and planned
study; Share general study information
sheet; Decision to participate/exclusion
from study by the researcher
Pre-
interview:
second
contact
Option for further questions regarding
study; Arrange interview practicalities (e.g.
time/date, means); Share participant
information sheet; Decision to
participate/exclusion from study by the
researcher
Interview:
theme 1
Participant’s role in organisation; Career
pathway, education
Interview:
theme 2
Attacker-centric thinking in daily work
practices of the participants; Usage of
informal or formal attacker representations
(e.g. personas/taxonomies); Examples of
such representations
Interview:
theme 3
View on the future potential of
attacker-centric thinking; Future security
trends or emerging threats in relation to an
attacker focus
Feedback:
rst stage
Share conversation notes and re-share
participant information sheet; Participants
to provide consent to use data or request
changes (via email)
Feedback:
second
stage
(optional)
Share amended conversation notes for
participant consent (if any changes made);
Further opportunity for follow-up
questions or sharing of further materials
from the researcher/participants
No security countermeasures or protection approaches explicit
to the organisation were discussed and included in the results, thus
mitigating the risk of negative implications for the organisation
or individuals. To protect the condentiality of the participants,
all data was used anonymously and identifying information was
removed or anonymised. The study was completed following the
relevant ethics review process of the researcher’s academic insti-
tution (under Full-Review-1194-2018-08-29-11-07-PWAI216 and -
1624-2019-04-02-21-21-PWAI216).
3.2 Data analysis
A exible and largely explorative, yet structured method of data
analysis was required to not restrict the open-ended nature of
this research, but without losing track of the underlying research
questions posed. For this purpose, thematic analysis as a primarily
inductive, iterative analysis process to identify, analyse, organise,
describe and report patterns (themes) found in the data collated
[8] was chosen (see Figure 1 for examples). Thematic analysis is
frequently used in qualitative academic HCI and commercial UX
research, e.g. in the case study research by Bruun et al. [4] investi-
gating the role of UX professionals in agile development practices.
NVivo was used as a software package to support the organi-
sation and coding of the conversation notes, review of the code
structure and for the ongoing reective memo writing. A number
of dierent coding methods (based on the proles provided in the
coding manual by Saldaña [37]).
Analysis and coding were initially completed for the rst four
interviews of the rst round, followed by an academic peer review
(by three senior researchers in the eld of information security).
The relatively low number of interviews however meant that theo-
retical saturation (where no new data and ideas emerge from the
data collection [7] ch.1), had not been reached at this point in time,
prompting the need for further data collection (second round of
interviews). Similar themes and elements kept re-occurring approx-
imately after a total of 10 interviews had been completed, indicating
a level of theoretical saturation (with the sample restriction to one
case company).
Figure 1: Examples of practitioner quotes from interviews
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4 RESULTS
4.1 The underlying basis: threat intelligence
Building a comprehensive picture of the threat landscape — threat
intelligence, which can be dened as “the output of analysis based
on identication, collection, and enrichment of relevant data and
information” to inform security decision-making [36], is viewed
as paramount for understanding and modelling threats against an
organisation — this also includes intelligence on attackers. The
interviewed practitioners were aware or actively using a number of
threat intelligence approaches and resulting data insights, mention-
ing e.g. initiatives to source contextual attacker data to trace actors
on the darknet via research and intelligence suppliers, but also more
generic attacker proling eorts referring to e.g. attack methods
and tools or demographic factors including the geographic origin
of attacks — basic attacker proling was mentioned by almost all
participants. In this context however, limitations were described as
to what data and information banks could source for their threat
intelligence programmes. Furthermore, the right organisational
setup regarding threat intelligence mattered to one participant: in
banking, many attacks and crimes cross the line between the cyber
and physical world — it therefore made sense to move from separate
intelligence teams to an aligned team spanning physical and cy-
ber security, including ATM and mobile security (threat modelling
senior manager).
Information gathering, sharing and reassurance — threat intelli-
gence also plays a key part in informing (and reassuring) senior
stakeholders about current threats, as for example told by an op-
erational risk manager: “senior stakeholders come to me as they
have read about attacks and attackers...”. Other security, risk and
fraud teams across the organisation will heavily depend on threat
intelligence teams and their analysis as a way of thinking about
attackers in their everyday roles, e.g. through threat radars and
assessments (as mentioned by a threat intelligence manager).
Open source information: defenders vs. attackers — while open
source information (e.g. social media networks such as Twitter)
is an extremely important intelligence source for defenders, the
same logic applies for attackers: they will also be using open source
intelligence, for example to nd out about new attack surfaces
into banks or their suppliers. This ‘arms race’ between these two
groups was discussed in detail by one of the risk managers with
an ethical hacking background, e.g. “when we get better at using
data for defending, they get better too”. Open source information
may also have a far more direct attacker focus: one participant
mentioned the possibility of identifying vague direct threats against
the banking organisation through open source monitoring (e.g. a
planned attack could be announced or arranged via social media).
Similarly, media impact and reporting on (potential) attacks and
attackers was also seen as a key aspect to be monitored by one of
the security executives.
4.2 Purpose and gains of an attacker focus
Supporting a strategic view — in terms of benets gained from an
attacker-centric perspective, an attacker focus was seen as more
helpful for a “tactical level security perspective” (fraud senior man-
ager) or a “broad and shallow macro-level strategic view” (oper-
ational risk manager) rather than modelling threats directly on
attackers. The threat modelling senior manager and security strate-
gist in the participant group stated “there is a tendency to look at
things at a very granular level rather than from a strategic point of
view”, preferring a strategic view as a proactice approach to identify
and assess potential future threats. Furthermore, using exemplary
attacker group representations was seen as benecial for taking a
“proactive approach to identify and assess potential future threats”.
These statements are certainly related to the criticism exercised
against attacker-centric modelling by Shostack ([40] p.40) — while
using attacker information or representations to model specic
threats and attack techniques might not work very well, using such
information for taking a more strategic, long-term view may be a
more ecient starting point. This assumption seemed generally
supported in the sample, e.g. by a threat intelligence manager: “it’s
hard to predict the future thinking like an attacker” or by an opera-
tional risk manager: “we don’t care about who they are, but care
about their tools/techniques”.
Another strategic aspect around ‘knowing your enemy’ was
also mentioned: rather than informing exact countermeasures and
mitigations to be used, the nature of the expected attacker (group)
behind an attack may dene the strategic defence approach, i.e.
organisations under attack could decide to focus on ‘damage limi-
tation’ only if up against powerful nation state attacks (as told by
the security executive) and also by a threat intelligence manager:
“...knowing who is behind the attacks may help to understand how
far they will go”. This is likely to refer to organisations focussing
their eorts to maintain or restore minimum services during or af-
ter an attack (and communicate the chosen approach appropriately
to the public, as mentioned by an operational risk manager) rather
than trying to fully return to the pre-attack state too quickly.
Understanding the criminal business model — gathering as well
as analysing attacker information was largely seen as helpful in
understanding the business model of organised groups, supporting
a holistic view of the overall security ecosystem,“making sense of
what’s happening” (threat intelligence manager). Specically, “un-
derstanding people” is seen “as likely to mean a better understand-
ing of cyber operations” and business models (as told by a threat
intelligence manager). The attribution of the globally devastating
WannaCry ransomware attacks to North Korean state-sponsored
hackers was used as an example to illustrate this: explaining Wan-
naCry as an attack from a nation state actor rather than an inde-
pendent group “made sense” to them (due to the large scale of the
attack and the previously unclear motivation behind it). It was also
seen as helpful for future modelling purposes, where such group
examples could then be included, e.g. in threat scenarios.
Similarly, understanding further business model elements such
as ‘hackers for hire’ was mentioned in this context by a security
executive, with a senior manager distinguishing between ‘hands-on’
attackers and ‘criminal managers’ recruiting or contracting services
for large scale attacks (explicitly mentioning the NSCS report on
understanding the online business model behind cybercrime [32]).
Here, the complexity of criminal business models was further hinted
at: the same hackers for hire may be recruited by dierent criminal
groups (or identical or at least similar malware may be purchased
or commissioned as mentioned by a threat intelligence manager)
— meaning that the same attack patterns and signatures may be
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present across various groups and attacks. Overall, participants
seemed to talk condently about the business model employed
by attackers, e.g. a fraud senior manager speaking of “massive
organised criminality with call centre-scale type operations: huge,
organised, sophisticated and successful at scale”, “trying to run a
business just like we are”.
4.3 Considerations for practice
Attacker modelling in practice: view of existing groups — consider-
ing attacker groups and relationships seems to form an important
element in modelling attackers in the organisation, as evidenced
by two participants talking about this aspect. Group information is
seen as more relevant than information on single attackers: “[threat
intelligence] doesn’t usually go down to the individual, but group
levels” (threat intelligence manager). This is supported by a threat
intelligence senior manager describing threat scenarios often mod-
elling attackers on past experiences or incidents as well as existing
groups, employing a neutral label rather than an exact group name.
As an example of an existing group used as a blueprint for practical
modelling, Lazarus is mentioned in the interview (refer to [18]).
Attacker modelling in practice: threat libraries, scenarios and at-
tack pathmaps — a number of approaches including attacker-centric
aspects are mentioned by the practitioners in the sample. A threat
intelligence manager describes working with a customised cyber
threat lists created through collaborative industry eorts, but also
the usage of existing databases and libraries such as the MITRE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) list [28]. Threat sce-
narios are mentioned (albeit without specic procedural detail):
“thinking through a scenario from an attacker’s perspective and
trying out what they could do” (threat intelligence senior manager).
This is in line with existing approaches in the banking sector —
Green for example introduces a structured approach to ‘cyber sce-
nario planning’ based on threat actors and impact analysis for a
number of scenarios [12]. Three of the participants also describe
the importance of mapping the attack path, considering potential or
previously observed entry points exploited by attackers at either an
individual user or at an organisational level — industry-wide eorts
may also support this through sharing such maps and experiences,
e.g. at which layer of defence the attack was ultimately stopped (as
told by a threat intelligence manager).
Representations of the human attacker — an interest in attacker
proling including demographics like geographic location or na-
tionality is displayed by several interview participants, with a num-
ber also referring to specic groups: “I am aware of dierent at-
tacker proles such as internal fraudsters, members of a gang...”
(fraud strategy manager) or “...distinct attacker groups are used
e.g. political/ideological, organised crime...” (security executive).
Four of the participants also mention the concept of attacker per-
sonas, e.g. “human representations such as personas may help to
serve as a baseline and help to design against a large group of
people/fraudsters, understand them better and visualise the knowl-
edge we already have” (fraud strategy manager) or specically
for the case of money mules: “money mule data, risk proles and
demographics are known... usage of datapoints/analytics to iden-
tify money mules and fraudulent accounts can help to create per-
sona proles” (security executive). Human attacker proles are also
viewed as benecial for practical aspects such as security awareness
or to train sta (operational risk manager) or to compare patterns
of malicious attacker and genuine customer behaviour for pattern
analysis in fraud prevention (fraud senior manager). Lastly, one
participant (security executive) also mentions support for victims as
crucial, based on “cybercriminals harming people, not just banks”.
Attacker determination as a new proling dimension — another
valuable insight resulting from an attacker-centric approach is at-
tacker determination, as mentioned in two of the interviews (secu-
rity executive/threat intelligence manager). While motivation of the
attackers is considered in most attacker categorisations, determina-
tion is not mentioned specically. But according to the interviews,
the level of determination in the attacker, as well as the nature
of motivation, is seen as important for defence. Knowing who is
behind attacks is seen to help understand how far they will go, with
for example nation state actors and other ‘ocials’ as attackers
likely to behave dierently to professional criminals — this level
of risk taking and behaviour is explained due to them being most
likely to be in less danger of being prosecuted in combination with
an assumed high levels of available resources.
4.4 Integrating into the business environment
Work routines and attacker focus — most participants acknowledge
the presence of some level of attacker-centric thinking, methods
or techniques in their everyday work: attackers may play a role in
job routines e.g. “as part of threat radars and assessments” (threat
intelligence manager) or when working with tools, e.g. for fraud
analysis and monitoring. Two of the participants also mentioned
the problem of “too much data” in this context, making analysis at
an individual attacker level dicult. When describing their roles,
most participants also talked about the importance of collaboration
to distribute attacker information across dierent functions of the
organisation, e.g. through providing threat intelligence data, help-
ing business areas through providing consultancy or by creating a
proactive, “generative” risk culture to be “channeled into risk teams
and the wider bank” (operational risk senior manager). As already
indicated, attacker information may support such a collaborative
culture, e.g. by helping to raise security awareness or to train sta
(as told by an operational risk manager). However, a fraud strategy
manager also made clear that he ‘realistically had no time to think
about attackers/adversaries on an everyday basis in his role’ and
that attackers therefore felt “a little bit detached to me... I am not
necessarily happy about this”. In direct relation, he and another par-
ticipant (threat intelligence manager) emphasised the importance of
“time to think (and not necessarily as a brainstorm/group thinking
exercise)” and to “slow down” to “make things better” and “accom-
modate security and balance customers needs/wants/expectations”.
A fraud strategy manager also stressed that, just like with other
organisational aspects, skills, experiences and knowledge relation
to attackers, are dicult to record and retain in modern workplaces
undergoing constant change (including sta movements).
Balancing business, customer and security needs — attacker in-
formation naturally only forms a small part of everyday routines
and task of the digital banking practitioners interviewed: they are
balancing a number of perspectives and stakeholders, focussing
on business needs and meeting regulatory requirements. While
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security solutions, mitigations and the plugging of control gaps and
their impact need to be costed up internally (security executive),
external factors such as regulatory developments but also the com-
petitive landscape (a senior fraud manager mentions the example
of “recent industry developments which may have an impact on
customers, e.g. the latest ‘fraud guarantee’ initiative from a com-
petitor”) make this a complex environment to operate in and apply
attacker-centric security principles to. On balancing risk and secu-
rity with business requirements and customer needs, a risk senior
manager views “cybercrime and cyberwarfare as a continuous and
growing risk also for banks — this and rising customer expectations
(better/faster) need competent people and the right controls”. He
underlined this customer focus taken by the organisation by de-
scribing a “x-and-learn-approach” (x it for the customer rst and
conduct a post-review) as part of an ongoing and iterative review
of security controls.
Mapping and securing digital customer journeys — the concept
of the digital customer journey and its relation to attackers is dis-
cussed by almost all participants: it signies the path users and
potential customers take to move through service and product se-
quences oered via the banks’ digital channels including online and
mobile banking. An operational risk manager working in technol-
ogy explains that a “further move towards a ‘digital bank’ means
external threats become more important... so further understanding
of attackers would be useful”. To accommodate this, “threat mod-
elling of the customer journey at a transactional level (end-to-end
including user registration)” is described by a fraud senior manager,
and a threat intelligence manager has worked with “fraud process
end-to-end mapping” where various user and attacker types (or
personas) can be inserted into the sequence (‘follow the money’). As
individual elements of the journey may deter or encourage fraud-
sters, e.g. the login element or registration and account opening
processes, they need to be analysed in detail, including related user
behaviour, e.g. push notications fatigue (as told by a fraud senior
manager and security executive).
Changes and new innovation to the customer journey may have
a ‘knock-on eect on fraud’, therefore requiring risk assessments of
the new functionality and “a look across the entire digital ecosystem
as a potential fraud aggregator” — this is “in contrast to a generic
model to explain fraud occurrences, but specic to customer jour-
neys” with the aim to ‘build security in’ (as told by two fraud senior
managers). Potential and previously encountered entry points of
attackers can be mapped against the digital banking ecosystem and
specic customer journeys, also considering non-digital, traditional
elements like branches as vulnerabilities (e.g. for opening new mule
accounts as mentioned by a security executive). However, a threat
intelligence manager is critical of this approach in the future as “the
question around which entry route an attacker could use becomes
non-feasible/obsolete with increase in large, complex and intercon-
nected technologies” (and the related diculty to accurately and
completely map the related customer journey).
4.5 Future directions
Data-driven attacker modelling — practitioners in the sample gen-
erally expect attacker information to play a role in their future
work, but with a strong focus on data patterns rather than infor-
mal human attacker descriptions. “Because ultimately, dening
and making these exact attacker proles useful is so dicult” —
the overall expectation for a fraud senior manager is to see more
data-driven initiatives which may also include attacker information,
e.g. data tracking digital footprints of devices or other biometric
information for proling. Several participants mention machine
learning as a future opportunity to watch in this eld, e.g. “data
has always been in the focus to understand and prevent fraud and
cybercrime patterns, but it will get even better (for example through
machine learning to build fraud proles)” (fraud senior manager).
A security executive also recognises the potential to detect money
mules and related patterns with the help of machine learning. At a
more generic level, a (not further dened) “development towards
scientic modelling for cyber risk” is expected by an operational
risk manager in this context.
Emerging technologies as a risk and opportunity — in contrast
to the last point, machine learning (ML) and articial intelligence
(AI) is also seen as a potential attack vector in the future: “another
potential risk lies in the area of ML/AI: if this is not truly under-
stood, unintended circumstances may arise from this. There is a
risk for ‘machine bias’ and ‘bots getting too clever’. Further di-
culties in this area may be the diculty to prove to the regulator
what underlies decision-making. Lastly, there is the opportunity
for manipulation (unintended or malicious)” (as told by a risk se-
nior manager). Attacker-centric views are seen to likely play a role
in designing new controls around emerging threats and changing
threat landscape, and to understand new security economics by
an operational risk manager in the sample. Not directly related to
attackers, participants mention other aspects on their professional
‘roadmap’ for the near future, e.g. secure customer authentication
or regulatory requirements. A threat intelligence manager explicitly
highlights future thinking around attacks against internet-of-things
and home devices or blockchain applications already presented in
theoretical academic literature, but in his opinion requiring fur-
ther denition of specic business cases and scalability. Lastly, data
sharing between banks and other companies is viewed as a new
opportunity (e.g. insights and business opportunities) and challenge
(e.g. privacy, data protection and customer expectations that can’t
be met), with a risk senior manager citing the example of a UK
challenger bank oering the switching of energy suppliers in-app
to their customers.
Increasingly complex and interconnected systems — the digital
banking environment of the future is complex, with pressures added
by competitors, regulators, customers as well as technology and
security requirements to be met: “it’s only going to get harder to
understand and will become more complex the more interconnected
systems get. There is a number of signicant inuences such as
cultural, technological, customer needs and wants or fraud risk.
Examples would include third party systems such as Apple/Google
Pay having an impact on internal processes or timelines” (as told
by a fraud strategy manager).
Threat readiness and proactive attitude — the question on using
attacker-centric approaches in the future yields limited insights,
but attacker information is seen to play a role going forward in
threat readiness. Threat readiness as a discipline can be explained
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as looking into ‘unlikely’ threats and establishing probable mitiga-
tions and solutions for them. In regard to future threats, potential
data breaches are identied as something to analyse further (as
mentioned by a threat intelligence senior manager) — here, an at-
tacker focus is seen as useful, addressing questions about what data
would attackers be most interested in and what seems most valu-
able to them. Three participants also talk about levels of insecurity
around emerging risks, e.g. an operational risk manager: “...while
we often encounter the same risks, the landscape is changing, with
new risks emerging and risks we have never seen — leading to an
uncomfortable position”. At the same time, they advocate a proac-
tive attitude to threats and risk, e.g. a threat intelligence manager
stating that “as with all the models in the world, if you are not
ready for something new, they are not helpful” or an operational
risk manager demanding more decisive dealings with threats.
5 DISCUSSION
Based on the insights and learnings brought forward so far, a list of
12 recommendations and guidance points on the usage of attacker-
centric approaches in security is attempted in this section. The
second part of this section reects on the key ndings in this paper,
also looking into the future of the research topic.
5.1 Recommendations and guidance notes
(1) Consider attacker-centric approaches to develop a strategic view
on threats and security. A key insight gained from the analysis
in this work is the usage of attacker-centric approaches in a
strategic sense. Using models of attackers or attacker groups
(even informal ones) and related threat scenarios may poten-
tially help to develop a strategic view on current and future
threats. While the actual implementation for such an approach
is likely to vary across organisations and further research would
be benecial, this realisation seems to be of signicant practical
value. It also aligns with the understanding that attacker-centric
threat modelling is often ineective (acknowledged in the next
point). It may ultimately be better suited for another purpose
like supporting a strategic view on security.
(2) Recognise and accept limitations for attacker-centric approaches.
While this paper has focussed on attackers and attacker-centric
approaches, the limitations of such approaches need to be un-
derstood if they are to be used eectively. Although these limi-
tations may dier for the context of application, one of the most
important realisations is certainly the perceived ineectiveness
of attacker-centric approaches for structured threat modelling
— here, approaches deconstructing the system and data ows
may provide better guidance to most modellers.
(3) As an academic, learn from security practitioners (and vice versa).
The analysis in this work shows a discrepancy between aca-
demic research themes and topics that matter most in daily
practice: while formalisations and frameworks dominate the
academic space, daily security practice includes threat intelli-
gence approaches and far more informal modelling eorts. It
is felt that both sides would benet from bridging this dispar-
ity, with an interest in academic research also indicated in the
practitioner interviews.
(4) Benet from attacker-centric approaches to understand attacker
ecosystem and criminal business models. While this point was
highlighted by practitioners, it was not evaluated in much de-
tail in reviewed academic materials — this seems like a missed
chance and further research in this area would be of value,
for example to assess the exact benet provided by such ap-
proaches, but also potential methods and procedures that can
be used in this context.
(5) Choose from a range of attacker-centric approaches with varying
levels of formality and required eort. To integrate attackers into
daily security practice or academic research, there are a variety
of methods and techniques to choose from, for example abstract
attacker models, attack path maps, attack trees, misuse cases
and threat scenarios, but also attacker personas or typologies.
It is also crucial to realise that attacker-centric approaches can
be implemented to varying degrees — they may supplement
existing methods or form a fundamental part of a security
programme.
(6) Use attacker-centric approaches as a communication or training
tool. Given the stated strategic benets and the often visual
nature of attacker-centric approaches like attacker personas,
typologies or digital journey maps may help to explain current
security trends to senior stakeholders, e.g. provide assurance
around media reports or to make a case for security spending.
These attacker-centric tools may also play a role in training
exercises with security and non-security teams, e.g. to raise
security awareness or evaluate current work practices.
(7) Actively look for and address potential biases present in security
teams. Personal bias may be present in security teams when
thinking about attackers — individuals may for example over-
or underestimate the threat originating from certain attackers
or attacker groups (based on experience or knowledge). This
potential presence should rst be acknowledged and secondly
countered if possible — personas are seen as a method to address
such biases in user-centred design and hence may also be of
benet in an information security context.
(8) Consider attacker entry points in the (online and oine) digital
customer journey. Practitioners working in the area of digital
banking in our interviews place great emphasis on the model
and visualisation of the digital customer journey as a series of
steps customers will move through when completing a bank
service or sales processes. Mapping attackers, their activities
and resources (for example in the form of attacker typology
types, personas or path maps) against this sequence may help to
identify potential vulnerabilities and attack entry points when
assessing existing journeys, but also changes to be made or
entirely new innovations.
(9) Integrate attacker-centric thinking into the assessment of emerg-
ing technologies. As ML and AI have moved from theoretical
concepts into practice used by banks, attacker-centric thinking
may also help when identifying and assessing threats, risks and
the related need for new security controls.
(10) Start thinking about how attackers and threat modelling can
be built into agile ways of working. As agile ways of working
with multidisciplinary teams become more widespread across
organisations around the world, ways of integrating threat
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modelling into these processes need to be identied. Davoust
[9] has suggested for teams in organisations to be trained to
use agile and continuous threat modelling and uses an attacker
proling exercise to support this. Collaboration within and
between teams throughout the development process seems
crucial in this context, recognising that everyone is responsible
for security and it needs ‘to be built in’ rather than ‘bolted on’.
While no comprehensive frameworks around this have been
found here, concepts such as evil user stories (“As a hacker, I
can send bad data in HTTP headers, so I can access data and
functions for which I’m not authorized”, in OWASP [33]) seem
like an interesting starting point to combine attacker-centric
and agile approaches to security.
(11) Collaborate around attacker-centric thinking and share attacker-
related information. Threat intelligence and the sharing of at-
tacker information should underlie the concept of attacker focus
in practice across the organisation, and beyond where possi-
ble. This should be extended into collaboration eorts around
attacker focus, both within organisations (e.g. through agile
working sessions and workshops examining journey maps and
related attacker entry points) or in the form of industry-wide
initiatives and working groups. Tools and techniques enabling
such sharing and collaboration eorts eectively have also
been discussed widely in literature, e.g. attacker typologies or
personas, but also threat and attack pattern libraries (e.g. In-
tel Threat Agent Library [16] or CAPEC [5]) — re-using such
existing frameworks can also enable scalability, comparability
and reduce duplication of eorts.
(12) Lastly, publicise insights and learnings in this area to support oth-
ers. Given the limited amount of research currently presented,
further practical and academic eorts seem required to advance
this eld of research. Considering the amount of valuable state-
ments from only a small number of initial interviews, there
seems to be signicant potential for further insight to be gained.
It is therefore crucial that practitioners consider making some
of their learning and experiences public, for example through
presentations at industry-specic or academic conferences.
5.2 Reection
(1) Further denition of expected benets required — exact benets
and outcomes associated with the usage of attacker-centric
approaches often remain unclear, as evidenced by the reviewed
literature items in this research. There seems to be an underly-
ing assumption that knowing more about attackers is helpful in
the context of modelling threats and supporting security prac-
tice in general, although the exact motivation and the ‘why?’
behind using attacker-centric approaches are often ill-dened.
While this research provides an initial step into this direction
(e.g. the move towards a higher-level strategic view over gran-
ular modelling eorts), this current shortcoming should be
acknowledged and ideally be featured in future research.
(2) Many dierent methods in existence currently — current ap-
proaches which use attacker information or employ an attacker
focus vary signicantly in terms of eort required as well as
rigour and detail involved. Hence, there seems to be a signif-
icant potential for unication and formalisation of tools and
techniques, with the aim of establishing realistic and ecient
options for reusability, comparability and shareability.
(3) Changing perspectives to a more strategic outlook — the proposi-
tion of using attacker-centric approaches to support a macro-
level strategic view of practitioners is certainly worth consid-
ering. It is in contrast to the principle of using attacker infor-
mation for threat modelling at a granular level — an approach
which has been criticised over recent years as ineective in
comparison to system- or security-focussed eorts. Assigning
a specic purpose to attacker-centric approaches could also
help to solve the rst two issues mentioned here, potentially
supporting consolidation and further concentration of exist-
ing methods. Beyond this research, there are certainly signs
that this could be the future direction for attacker-centric ap-
proaches. Krebs [22] for example sees actor attribution as a key
intelligence aspect as malware evolves.
(4) Cautious, but positive outlook on attacker personas in theory and
practice — while previous work has highlighted the ability of
attacker personas to ‘bring attackers to life’ and make them
more accessible, tangible and realistic to a wide range of se-
curity stakeholders, they may also be used as a support tool
for communication and collaboration [42] or to help mitigate
potential bias in organisations [1]. While practitioners in this
work show interest in using attacker personas, experiences of
working with them seem limited — here, aligning them to rep-
resentations already used teams across the agile organisation
like digital journey maps may provide an entry point for future
research.
(5) Integrating security into digital experience management — prac-
titioners placed high importance on business requirements, but
also user needs, related to the digital journey and experience of
(potential) customers to the bank. In this context, visualisation
and mapping techniques such as customer journey maps, attack
path maps and attacker personas are mentioned to support the
alignment of business, user and security needs, also tting into
research areas of usable security or human-computer interac-
tion for security. Additionally, such approaches may be of use
for security disciplines such as threat modelling.
6 CONCLUSION
In summary of this paper, thinking about attackers plays some
role in the daily work routines for nancial services practition-
ers. It may however take a number of forms, e.g. through threat
intelligence reports distributed across the organisation, usage of
threat scenarios or examples of attacker groups, also depending on
the individual job description. It is important to understand that
this role is limited — reasons mentioned are e.g. time constraints
and dierent focus in the practitioner’s overall job role, but also a
lack of perceived practical value or related tools available to them.
Further academic enquiries into the potential of attacker-centric
approaches in practical settings may hence be of value — future
research directions may include e.g. work on visualisations ot tools
such as attacker personas or integration into the practical discipline
of digital customer experience management, in the area of banking
and beyond. For this particular research, a future extension with
additional case companies should be considered.
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